Journal of True Enlightenment ─ Issue 3

【作者】正覺學報編輯部

【出版日期】2009年12月

【書號】978-986-83966-4-7

【開本】16開,268頁

【定價】300元台幣/ 輯

全文下載
  • 學報宗旨

  • 編輯序言

  • 論文一

  • 論文二

  • 論文三

  • 論文四

學報宗旨

正覺學報的宗旨,在於弘揚釋迦牟尼佛實證第八識如來藏而成就佛道的佛法義學,秉持學術界客觀求真的科學精神,以合乎三量--至教量、現量、比量--的辯證方法,公平客觀的引證態度,以及真修實證的立場,引導佛學界回歸以實證為目標的佛法義學。

Mission Statement

The mission of the Journal of True Enlightenment is to spread Buddha Sakyamuni's doctrine of attaining Buddhahood through the personal realization of the eighth consciousness, Tathagatagarbha, and to guide the Buddhist academia back to the correct understanding of Buddhist sutras based on the scientific spirit of objectively pursuing the truth, the methodology of the three-ways-of- knowing—knowing by ultimate teachings, personal experience and logical inference, the fair attitude of citation, and the standpoint of both real practice and personal realization.

學術界經常使用西方史學的方法進行佛學研究,然而研究的結論經常不能令佛教界心悅誠服,乃至產生許多的衝突。這種採用西方史學方法進行佛學研究始自清末民初,研究者對於西方史學研究方法的採用,產生對中國史學的全面性衝擊。於是史學界便有所謂的「疑古派」史學家不斷地出現,成為近代史學研究的主要流派。疑古派的研究態度對於史學研究雖有所貢獻,但是也經常產生荒謬不經的結論而貽笑大方,例如顧頡剛就是代表性人物。顧頡剛提出中國古代史是「層累地」造成,震撼中國古代史的研究;但是,他認為「禹是一條蟲」,則又淪為史學研究的笑柄。為什麼一位精於運用史學方法的學者,竟然會有評價這麼極端的結果?答案是,疑古派以「不知為不有」作為研究的思想前提,導致凡是「不知的」就一定「不存在」的誤謬。除此之外,東西方史學研究方法過於重視文字文獻而缺乏實地證實的方法,其不足與錯誤也是導致誤謬的重要因素。綜合而言,對於西方史學思想與方法的全面採用,而沒有反思其前提是否正確的能力,也就沒有發現其謬誤而加以批判的智慧,這樣的研究必然導致研究成果品質的不穩定,乃至於全盤皆錯的境地。

同樣的,既然學術界使用史學方法進行大眾所熟悉之世俗世界的歷史研究,尚且產生極大的錯謬;若要對於本質上超越世俗世界,追求法界實相智慧的佛教來進行學術研究,如果研究者本身沒有認識清楚生命與法界的本質與事實真相,也不相信佛教中有真實修行與實證實相智慧的事實時,有可能不犯下錯誤嗎?對於這樣的命題,我們並不學習疑古派所主張「懷疑一切」的錯誤前提與態度;相反的,本會一些研究人員以實事求是的研究精神,從符合傳統佛教實證精神的三量原則,強調「實證佛教、實踐佛學」的重要性,進行史學命題的專題研究,以論文的形式提出研究成果,並且通過審查。茲臚列本期採用的三篇論文如下:

  1. 真史學與新史學——以《阿含經》略論佛教的史學地位(蔡禮政)
  2. 史權、史責與史家(白志偉、蔡禮政)
  3. 佛學研究與歷史想像——以阿含部經典略評呂凱文〈從兩類《央掘魔羅經》探討聲聞經大乘化的詮釋學策略〉(高惠齡、蔡禮政)

蔡禮政著作的〈真史學與新史學——以《阿含經》略論佛教的史學地位〉,係針對史學史的發展脈絡中,近代梁啟超以「新史學」之名,對於舊史學展開一系列有關於歷史的定義、主體範圍等等進行批判。而東西方史學界皆不約而同地以「新史學」之名,提出各種歷史理論與哲學觀念著作史籍,挑戰前人的理論與哲學觀點,乃至引發後現代主義對於傳統歷史主義的種種挑戰;於是基於文獻、文字、實物等等歷史遺跡作為史學基礎的傳統史學幾近於崩解,形成史學界「歷史之死」的恐懼。因此,「新史學」的蓬勃發展,反而導致「歷史之死」的危機。

該文認為不論新舊史學皆將歷史寄託於文字、實物等等歷史遺跡上,是對於歷史的錯誤定義,正確的歷史定義應以所有事實作為範圍,而不以歷史遺跡為限,並以此展開對於歷史的性質、主體範圍、功能等等的探討。該文認為歷史的性質具有過去性、現在性與未來性,並不僅止於傳統史學所認為的過去性,或極少數史學家認為的現在性而已;而歷史主體並不是僅有人類而已,歷史主體範圍應該要包括與人類共同生存的畜生道有情,乃至完整的歷史主體則是十法界的一切有情。

該文認為新舊史學將歷史寄託於文字、實物等等,必然導致後現代主義所質疑歷史的斷裂、不連續、想像、不實等不可避免的問題;若歷史主體唯有人類,也必然導致人類眼光的狹隘與短視,最後危害人類本身的生存。因此,不論新舊史學所建立的史學皆是充滿不實、想像,是對眾生沒有利益的假史學,也是自身矛盾而導致「歷史之死」的假史學。真史學則以十法界有情各自皆有第八識如來藏作為判斷歷史主體的標準,如來藏的本體真實存在而能記錄一切業行,並且顯示名法(七識心)與色法(物質)之間的規律。依於第八識如來藏的真實存在所建立的真史學,才是符合法界事實真相的真正史學,才是有利益於一切有情的真史學。

由於該文釐清歷史的基本定義、性質、主體範圍與功能,並且針對新舊史學皆以名色作為內部邏輯的起點與終點,必然導致歷史產生斷裂、不連續的矛盾與不一致提出批判。該文提出以第八識如來藏作為史學內部邏輯的起點與終點,能使歷史不再產生斷裂、不連續的矛盾與不一致,重建史學的堅實基礎與架構,足令史學起死回生。因此,本篇論文不但具有學術創見,而且深具開創性,未來將對史學產生根本性的影響,使歷史學從危害有情的假史學時代,邁向利益一切有情的真史學時代。

白志偉與蔡禮政合著的〈史權、史責與史家〉,探討新舊史學家著作史籍係從種種事實中挑選部分事實而記述之;此種挑選事實的權利,即是史權。該文認為史學家應該為史權的實踐負起史責,而史權與史責亦是因果對應關係的一種;新舊史學家著作史籍,多是錯誤地建立欲界愛中我所的價值與意義,導致人類彼此不擇手段地爭奪世間名聞利養而征戰不已的情形加劇,這是史學家所必須負起教唆人類征戰的責任,而且不能逃脫於法界因果律則之外;不管他們信不信有因果律則存在,法界的事實就是這樣如實的呈現與紀錄。在此也提醒史學家面對法界的實相,使真正的歷史可以真實呈現而增上其利益有情的功能,達成以古鑑今而利益有情的功能,亦是真史學的一部分。因此史學家在行使史權的同時,必須對於應負的史責具有正確的認知。該文認為過去的史學家實踐史權,研究歷史事實、發現歷史規律時,眼光乃是極為狹隘而短視,僅以極短暫的數千年人類歷史,卻想推演整個法界的歷史規則,於是經常產生錯誤的結論。因此,一切史學家皆應該學習並宣揚真史學,以實證的方法擴大自己與一切有情的眼界,提昇有情在法界中的功德,才是史學家應盡的史責。

該文依於史學家挑選歷史事實的史權概念,擴充史家的範圍以吻合十法界有情的真實相,才能究竟成就真史學。換個層面來說,如同記載過去歷史的史學家一般,現代新聞從業人員與傳播從業人員,皆在每日發生的種種事實中選擇部分事實作為新聞而傳播之,因此也都是實行史權的史學家,也都應該遵守史學家的道德倫理規範,同樣也必須負起相對應的史責。從史權的概念再擴大之,則人人皆在生存的過程中,選擇部分事實而對其認知,並且依此認知而造作種種事業,所以人人皆是史學家,也都應該為自己選擇認知的事實,負起史責。該文探討史權、史責與史家的範圍,皆是史學界以往所忽略的領域,因此該文亦深具創見與開創性,是史學界難得一見的佳作。

高惠齡與蔡禮政合著的〈佛學研究與歷史想像——以阿含部經典略評呂凱文〈從兩類《央掘魔羅經》探討聲聞經大乘化的詮釋學策略〉〉,探討佛學研究應該以佛教的教理為核心,不應該以歷史想像及錯會文字後的判斷作為核心,並以呂凱文的系列論文作為舉例與評論的對象,顯示史學研究方法若以歷史想像、法義想像為核心,必然產生種種的謬誤。該文認為呂凱文主張「聲聞乘與聲聞經是大乘與大乘經的宿主」,預設小乘聲聞的歷史先於大乘菩薩的歷史,是預設立場而作先判的「大乘非佛說」的錯誤歷史想像,並不符合歷史事實。因為《阿含經》所記載的歷史事實是:佛陀先成佛之後,才宣說小乘聲聞法,不是先宣說《阿含經》小乘聲聞法以後才成佛;而佛陀本身是世世修習菩薩道而成佛者,不是世世修習聲聞解脫道而成佛者,所以佛陀本身就是大乘菩薩法道最高的果證者,當然不該如呂凱文所說的只懂《阿含經》解脫道的阿羅漢,而是真實已成之佛;而且佛陀的繼位者並不是聲聞阿羅漢,而是彌勒菩薩。這些都是三乘共許的歷史事實,由此便足以證明「大乘非佛說」之主張只是歷史想像,而非歷史事實。《阿含經》既已記載彌勒菩薩將於未來世成佛,是釋迦佛陀的繼位者,則已顯示聲聞阿羅漢的修證遠遠不如彌勒菩薩;此亦顯示三乘賢聖同聞大乘經典的事實,證明小乘聲聞亦是大乘經的聽聞者,只是因為沒有實證大乘法而聽不懂大乘菩薩法,故不能成就念心所,無法詳記大乘經的內容,所結集出來的大乘經典必然非常簡略而唯有名相。因此,只有在「大乘法與大乘經是聲聞乘與聲聞經的宿主」的歷史事實作為前提下,歷史事實與佛教教理才能達到一致性而沒有任何矛盾存在,這樣才是完備而且符合事實的佛學研究,才能符合佛法弘傳的真實歷史。

除此之外,該文認為呂凱文預設佛教的小乘聲聞與大乘菩薩二者間只存在著不可共量性,也是無知於歷史事實與佛教教理的錯誤觀念。因為佛教教理存在著至少四種位階的共量與不共量,但是只有一種大乘典範存在,小乘只是大乘入門的初階而非典範。四種位階從最下階到最上階為:六凡業道眾生、小乘聲聞(含攝緣覺)、大乘菩薩與佛陀。其中最下階六凡業道眾生的境界,是四種位階皆可共量的境界,小乘聲聞的境界是小乘聲聞、大乘菩薩與佛陀等三種法道有情皆可共量的境界,如此依序類推;反之,佛陀的境界具有其餘下三階所不可共量的性質,菩薩的境界具有餘下二階所不可共量的性質,如此依序類推。而小乘聲聞、大乘菩薩與佛陀三個位階,是三種並立的階梯,是適應於五濁惡世眾生根器,可以循序漸進往上修行的階梯,而以佛陀為唯一的典範,並沒有典範轉移或消滅的問題。

該文對於呂凱文論文所採用史學研究方法的錯誤前提,以及方法運用上專業不足的現象,提出種種精彩的評論,不但具體可見現代西方史學方法的不足與錯誤的前提假設,亦可一睹真正不掉入歷史想像的佛學研究所應具備佛法知見的專業性。該文對於佛教教理的闡述,以及對於史學研究方法的評論極富創見,亦是值得肯定的作品。

根據上述三篇論文的簡介可知,新舊史學對於歷史本身的定義、性質、主體範圍與功能等等最基本的內涵,不但不能正確認知與建立,而且所採用的史學理論與方法也無助於反思史學的困境,而尋得解決之道。由此可見,歷史學是目前人類發展過程中,仍然只是一門粗具雛型而尚未成熟的學科,因為人類可知的歷史只是極為短暫的數千年而已。這樣一門粗具雛型而尚未成熟的學科,其採用的研究方法也是極為幼稚而令人啼笑皆非。因為法界的事實真相中最關鍵而且是史學中最切身的事實與命題是:是否存在第八識如來藏作為一切生命的基礎?而這樣關於存在與否的命題,絕非只以極為幼稚的史學研究方法—「對比」古今中外的文獻—所能解決,特別要指出的是絕非取材於古時凡夫所寫下的文獻所能解決,也不是分析語源發展、語意邏輯等等解讀文字的史學方法所能解決。

實證佛教所宣說的聲聞解脫法門,或者菩薩實相智慧法門,乃至佛地的福德智慧雙具的境界,皆是以第八識如來藏真實存在,作為親證聲聞解脫、親證菩薩實相智慧,或者成就究竟佛道的基礎。因此,只有實證的方法,才能補足佛教史學乃至世間史學的研究方法;凡是不採用實證方法,僅以實證方法以外的史學方法—特別是以文字訓詁的方法—進行的佛學研究、歷史研究或者哲學研究,皆不能真正完整的解決問題。本期學報三篇關於歷史學的論文所申論者,正好顯示這樣的事實。祈請佛教界與學術界的賢達人士,共同思考其中的道理,並齊步邁向親證解脫與智慧的真史學境界。

Briefing

The academia usually applies the Western historiographical methodology to Buddhist studies. However, most of the research conclusions cannot convince the Buddhist society and even cause a lot of conflicts. The application of Western historiographical methodology to Buddhist research started from the late Ching and early Republican era. Due to the adoption of this methodology, it makes a great impact on the Chinese historiography, and thus the historians of so-called the Yigupai (the Doubting Antiquity School) continuously appear in the academia of historiography and become the main stream of the research in modern historiography. Although the research attitude of the Doubting Antiquity School contributes something to historiography, this attitude often makes some ridiculous conclusions and becomes a joke. For example, Gu Jiagang is a case in point; he proposed the theory that the history of ancient China was created “layer upon layer,” which shocked the researchers of the Chinese ancient history study; however, his viewpoint that “Yu is a worm” also became a joke. Why does a scholar who masters the methodology of historiography surprisingly have such extremely different evaluation results? The answer is that the Doubting Antiquity School uses the assumption that “those unknown must be nonexistent” as the logic premise of its research, and therefore it results in the false belief that anything “unknown” must be “nonexistent.” In addition, both Eastern and Western research methods on historiography overemphasize the method of documental study rather than actual realization; the insufficiency and errors of the method are the important factors in making wrong conclusions too. In sum, the completely adoption of the thought and method of Western historiography, yet without the capability to examine if the premise is correct or not, will make one lack of the wisdom to discover and criticize the errors. This way of research will definitely lead to the unreliable research results or even to a complete mistake.

With the application of historiographical method, the academia has made severe mistakes even in the historical research of the mundane world, which the public are familiar with; with the same methodology, if the academic research is about Buddhism, which is in essence beyond the mundane world and pursues the ultimate-reality wisdom of the dharma-realm, and if the researchers do not clearly understand the essence and true reality of both life and dharma-realm or believe the truth that there are real practice and actual realization of the ultimate-reality wisdom in Buddhism, how could it be possible not to make mistakes? For such a kind of proposition, we do not follow the wrong premise and attitude of “doubting everything” which is claimed by the Doubting Antiquity School; on the contrary, some researchers of our Association undergo the research of the proposition of historiography with the attitudes of finding the truth, conforming to the principle of three-valid-cognition-ways that is consistent with the traditional Buddhist positivism, and emphasizing the importance of “Positivist Buddhism and Practical Buddhist Study.” They submitted their research results with the format of thesis and have passed our review process. The following three papers have been accepted in this issue:

  1. True Historiography versus New Historiography─A Brief Discussion on the Position of Buddhism in Historiography Based on The Agama Sutras (Tsai Lichen)
  2. Historical Right, Historical Responsibility and Historians (Pai Chihwei and Chai Lichen)
  3. Buddhist Studies versus Imagination on History─A Brief Comment, based on The Agama Sutras, on Lu Kaiwen’s “How Did Mahayana Buddhism Reform Savaka Sutta?: On Mahayana’s Hermeneutical Strategies by Two Kinds of Buddhist Paradigms of A?gulim?la Sutta” (Kao Huiling and Tsai Lichen)

Tsai Lichen’s article “True Historiography versus New Historiography─A Brief Discussion on the Position of Buddhism in Historiography Based on The Agama Sutras” criticizes, from the development history of historiography, that the modern scholar Liang Qichao’s definition of history, the scope of subject, etc. for the old historiography in the name of “new historiography”; at the same time, both Eastern and Western historiographical societies proposed various historical theories and philosophical concepts in their articles in the name of “new historiography” to challenge the former scholars’ theories and philosophical concepts, and it even provoked the challenges from Postmodernism to the traditional Historicism. As a result, the traditional historiography, which is based on the historical remains such as documents, texts, actual materials, etc., almost collapsed, and the fear of the “death of history” was raised in the historiographical society. Therefore, the flourishing of “new historiography” reversely results in the crisis of the “death of history.”

Tsai thinks it is a wrong definition of history that both new and old historiographies all study the history based on the historical remains such as texts, actual materials, etc. The correct definition of history should be based on all facts, rather than the historical remains, to explore the natures, scope of subject, functions, etc. of history. This article thinks the natures of history possesses the characters of past, present and future rather than the character of past thought by the traditional historiography or the character of present thought by very few historians. In addition, the subject of history includes not only human beings; its scope should also include the animals that coexist with human beings. The complete subject of history should even include all sentient beings of the ten dharma-realms.

The article thinks both new and old historiographical researches based on texts, actual materials, etc. will definitely lead to the inevitable problems of breakage, discontinuity, imagination, untruth, etc. of history, which are questioned by Postmodernism. If the subject of history only includes human beings, it will definite lead to the narrow and short vision of human beings, and endanger the survival of human beings finally. Therefore, both the new and old historiographies are full of untruth and imagination, and are the false historiographies which cannot benefit the sentient beings. They are also the false historiographies that conflict with each other and result in the “death of history.” The true historiography uses the eighth consciousness Tathagatagarbha, which each sentient being in the ten dharma-realms has, as the criteria to judge the subject of history. The original entity of Tathagatagarbha really exists and can record all karmic deeds; it also can manifest the rules between the name dharma (the seven consciousnesses) and the form dharma (the materials). The true historiography based on the real existence of Tathagatagarbha is the real one that conforms to the true reality of the dharma-realm and can benefit all sentient beings.

The article clarifies the basic definition, properties, scope of subject and functions of history, and criticizes both new and old historiographies for their using the name-and-form as the starting and ending points of internal logic, which will surely lead to the conflict and inconsistency of breakage and discontinuation in history. The article proposes that Tathagatagarbha acts as the starting and ending points of internal logic in historiography, and it can avoid the conflict and inconsistency of breakage and discontinuation in history. This viewpoint rebuilds a firm, solid base and structure for historiography and makes it become alive again. In summary, this article is not only innovative in the academic field but also pioneering; it will produce a fundamental influence on the historiography in the future and let the historiography progress from the age of the false one that endangers sentient beings to the age of the true one that can benefit all sentient beings.

“Historical Right, Historical Responsibility and Historians,” coauthored by Pai Chihwei and Chai Lichen, explores the behavior that both the new and old historians write about history based on partial facts selected from all facts; this kind of right to select the facts is the historical right. This article thinks the historians should take the responsibility for the implementation of historical right; the historical right and historical responsibility are a kind of relation between cause and effect. While writing about history, most of the new and old historians wrongly build the value and significance based on the self-belongings of desire-realm, which lead to more and more fights for the worldly fame and wealth among human beings. These historians should be responsible for inciting people to fight; they also cannot be free from the rules of cause-and-effect in the dharma-realm; no matter they believe the existence of cause-and-effect rules or not, the facts of the dharma-realm are manifested and recorded truthfully. The article also reminds the historians to face the true reality of the dharma-realm so that the real history can be truly manifested and enhance its function of correcting current behavior through history to benefit sentient beings. This is a part of the true historiography too. Therefore, while performing the historical right, the historians should precisely understand the historical responsibility which they should take at the same time. The article thinks, when implementing the historical right to study the facts of history and find its rules, the past historians’ vision is very narrow and short; only based on the extremely short human history of several thousand years, they try to deduce the historical rules of the whole dharma-realm, and thus often come to the wrong conclusions. Therefore, all historians should learn and propagate the true historiography, broaden both their and all sentient beings’ outlook with the method of actual realization, and enhance all sentient beings’ merits and virtues of the dharma-realm; these are the responsibility which the historians should take.

Based on the concept of historical right that historians choose the historical facts, this article broaden the job scope of historians to conform to the true fact of the ten dharma-realm sentient beings, and therefore ultimately achieves the practice of the true historiography. From another aspect, the same as the historians who record the history, all modern staff of news and media select parts of the facts from various facts happened every day as the news and disseminate them; they are all the historians who perform their historical rights; therefore, they should comply with the historians’ ethic regulations and take the corresponding historical responsibility as well. From an extended concept of historical right, everyone, when living, selects parts of the facts, recognizes them and performs various karmic deeds according to the recognition; therefore everyone is the historian too and should take the responsibility of historical right for his selected recognition of the facts. The article researches the scope of historical right, historical responsibility and historians, which have been neglected by the historiographical society before. It is also a highly innovative and pioneering article which is an excellent work seldom found in the historiographical field.

“Buddhist Studies versus Imagination on History─A Brief Comment, based on The Agama Sutras, on Lu Kaiwen’s ‘How Did Mahayana Buddhism Reform Savaka Sutta?: On Mahayana’s Hermeneutical Strategies by Two Kinds of Buddhist Paradigms of A?gulim?la Sutta’,” coauthored by Kao Huiling and Tsai Lichen, explores the concept that Buddhist studies should use the doctrines of Buddhism as the kernel rather than the historical imagination and wrong judgment from the misunderstanding of texts. By citing Lu Laiwen’s series papers as examples and commenting on them, this article shows that the research method of historiography will make various mistakes if using the historical imagination and doctrinal imagination as the kernel. The article thinks Lu Kaiwen’s claim about “Sravakayana and the Sravakayana sutras being the host of Mahayana and the Mahayana sutras” and his presupposition about the Sravakayana history preceding the Mahayana history are a wrong historical imagination of “Mahayana being not the Buddha's teaching” posited by him, and do not conform to the historical facts. The facts recorded in The Agama Sutras are: After the Buddha had attained the Buddhahood, He expounded the Sravakayana dharma of Hinayana; it is not that the Buddha became a Buddha after He preached the Sravakayana dharma; the Buddha’s achievement of Buddhahood resulted from practicing the dharma of Mahayana Bodhisattva-Way in His past lives rather than practicing the dharma of Sravakayana Liberation-Way; therefore the Buddha is the realizer of the highest achievement of Mahayana Bodhisattva-Way. The Buddha is a real Buddha who had attained the Buddhahood at that time, but not an arhat who only know the Liberation-Way of The Agama Sutras, as claimed by Lu Kaiwen. In addition, the successor of the Buddha is not an arhat of Sravakayana but is Bodhisattva Maitreya. All these are the historical facts admitted by the three-vehicle practitioners. The above evidence can prove that “Mahayana being not the Buddha's teaching” is only historical imagination but not a historical fact. Because The Agama Sutras record that Bodhisattva Maitreya will become a Buddha in the future and is the successor of the Buddha, it manifests the fact that the realization level of the arhats is far below that of Bodhisattva Maitreya. It also shows the fact that all the sages and saints of the three-vehicles heard the Mahayana teachings at the same time, and proves that the Hinayana sound-hearers had heard the Mahayana teachings too. Due to not having actually realized the Mahayana dharma, these sound-hearers could not understand the dharma of Mahayana Bodhisattva-Way so as to be unable to fulfill the mental function of mindfulness; because they could not memorize the contents of Mahayana teachings, the Mahayana sutras which they collected are very rough and include the Buddhist terms only. Therefore, only under the premise of the historical fact that “Mahayana and the Mahayana sutras are the host of Sravakayana and the Sravakayana sutras,” the historical facts and the Buddhist doctrines can be consistent with each other. Only this way will the Buddhist studies be complete and in conformity with the facts, and can be consistent with the true history of the propagation of the Buddha dharma.

In addition, the article thinks Lu Kaiwen’s presupposition about only incommensurability between Hinayana Sravakayana and Mahayana Bodhisattva in Buddhism is also a wrong concept which results from the ignorance of the historical facts and Buddhist doctrines. In fact, in Buddhist doctrines, both commensurability and incommensurability exist in at least four stages: but there exists only one model of Mahayana and Hinayana is merely the elementary stage for entering Mahayana rather than a model. The four stages are, in order from the lowest to the highest, the sentient beings of the six ordinary karmic paths, Hinayana Sravakayana (including Pratyekabuddha), Mahayana Bodhisattva, and Buddha. Among them, the state of the lowest stage of the six ordinary karmic paths is a state that can be measured by all sentient beings of the four stages; the state of Hinayana Sravakayana is a state that can be measured by all sentient beings of Hinayana Sravakayana, Mahayana Bodhisattva and Buddha. The same scenario can be applied to the higher stages. On the other hand, the state of Buddha possesses the characters that cannot be measured by the sentient beings of the lower three stages; the state of Bodhisattva possesses the characters that cannot be measured by the sentient beings of the lower two stages, and so on. The three stages, Hinayana Sravakayana, Mahayana Bodhisattva and Buddha, are the three stages existing at the same time for the sentient beings of the evil world of five turbidities; they can progress toward the higher stages through gradual practice step by step in sequence, with the Buddha stage as the only model, and there does not exist the problem about paradigm shift or extinction.

The article brings up various excellent comments on Lu Kaiwen’s papers about the wrong premise of research method in historiography and the phenomenon of professional insufficiency in applying the methods. It provides an actual example for us to see the insufficiency and wrong premise or assumption in the research method of modern Western historiography, and also to see that a professional Buddhist researcher should possess sufficient Buddhist knowledge so as not to fall into the historical imagination. The viewpoints of this article are very creative in explaining the Buddhist doctrines and commenting on the research methods of historiography; it is a very good work too.

According to the brief introductions of the above three articles, we can know that both new and old historiographies can neither truly recognize nor set up the most fundamental connotations of definition, character, scope of subject and function of history; besides, the historiographical theory and methods they adopt are of no help to the introspection of difficulties in historiography and cannot find the solution. Therefore, in current human development process, the historiography is still an immature science which has a rough prototype because the recorded human history exists for only several thousand years. This kind of science, which is rough and immature, also has a very immature and funny research method. It is because the most critical and important fact and proposition in the true reality of dharma-realm and historiography are: “Does there exist Tathagatagarbha that is the base of all living beings?” This proposition about being or non-being can never be solved through the extremely immature research method of historiography—“comparative reading” between the modern and ancient documents, especially through the documents from the ancient ordinary people or the research methods of historiography that explain the text by analyzing the development of etymology and semantic logic.

The practice method of Sravakayana Liberation, that of Bodhisattva’sultimate-reality wisdom or even the state of Buddhahood possessing both virtue and wisdom, claimed by Positivist Buddhism, are all based on the real existence of Tathagatagarbha for the personal realization of Sravakayana Liberation, Bodhisattva’s ultimate-reality wisdom or ultimate Buddhahood. Only the method of Positivism can fix the problems of the research methods of Buddhist historiography or even worldly historiography. Consequently, all Buddhist researchers, historical researches or philosophical researches using the research methods other than the method of Positivism, especially using the method of text interpretation, can never really and completely solve the problems. The detailed discussions in the three papers about historiography in this issue exactly reflect this fact. Hope the wise in Buddhist and academic societies can contemplate the rationale in the papers together and march toward the state of true historiography that personally realize liberation and wisdom.

真史學與新史學──以《阿含經》略論佛教的史學地位
True Historiography versus New Historiography --A Brief Discussion on the Position of Buddhism in Historiography Based on The Agama Sutras

摘要

新史學是史學界挑戰舊史學的總標誌。在新史學不斷發展下,新史學也逐漸成為更新的史學理論所挑戰的目標。於是,在新史學的口號下,新史學逐步邁向後現代主義,將史學存在的所有理論基礎完全推翻,使得史學面臨「歷史之死」的困局。

後現代主義的挑戰,顯示出新舊史學理論的共同弊病,即是對於「歷史是什麼、歷史有何功能、歷史的主體範圍為何?」等等基本問題,缺乏理論的基礎與一致性。然而,後現代主義史學並沒有解決史學的基本問題,也沒有發現後現代主義本身的弊病,與其他新史學的弊病並無不同,反而在史學原本錯誤的基礎與方向,繼續前進而導致「歷史之死」的困境。本文發現,由於新舊史學皆建立在錯誤的邏輯起點與終點,因此新舊史學皆是錯誤的假史學。

本文嘗試對於史學的基本問題進一步探討,從根本上矯正新舊史學共同的弊病,使得史學得以起死回生,而邁向真史學的階段。本文研究發現,新舊史學混淆了歷史與歷史書的定義,並且錯誤地主張歷史只具有過去的性質,忽視歷史同時具有現在性與未來性的本質。

新舊史學家對於歷史主體範圍的爭議,只是少數人類與多數人類之爭而已,並沒有正確認識歷史主體的範疇,其實是包括十法界的一切有情。因此,新舊史學家所效忠的對象,以及對於歷史功能的認識也因為狹隘侷限而完全錯誤。

新舊史學家產生種種的錯誤,都是因為將歷史的邏輯起點建立在名色二法的相關性,忽視正確的歷史邏輯起點與終點,應該建立在出生名色二法的第八識入胎識如來藏。因為只有建立在如來藏的真史學,才能符合法界的事實真相,使得史學能夠發揮科學與理性的功能,令有情明瞭自己存在的法界地位,並以成就佛道作為努力的目標。

因此,真正具有專業知識與能力的史學家,只存在於佛教中,其餘皆非專業的史學家。而菩薩法道的五十二階位的修行次第,則是專業史學家的規格化嚴格訓練與程序。只有親證第八識如來藏的大乘勝義菩薩,才開始具有專業史學家的資格,而可以接受規格化的嚴格訓練與過程。法界中完成五十二階位而最後成就佛道的佛陀,則是最偉大的史學家。所以,佛教是史學的「總政府、總神經系」。

一、緒論

史學是門淵遠流長的學問,在數千年間不斷地擴充發展,並且影響人類的發展。最近一世紀多以來,史學產生極大的爭議,以及面臨極大的挑戰。首先是二十世紀初「新史學」對於傳統史學的革新與挑戰,並且獲得壓倒性的勝利。「新史學」一詞是梁啟超(1873-1929)於公元1902年(清光緒28年)在《新民叢報》上發表批判清朝以往歷代史學的文章篇名。梁啟超在〈新史學〉一文中,稱清朝以往的史學是「舊史學」,有四蔽二病,因而引起史學界一連串的熱烈討論,直到如今仍未停止。

此後,「新史學」不約而同地成為中西方史學發展中,挑戰所有先前史學理論的總標誌,凡是對於已經發表的史學理論進行批判與挑戰者,皆以「新史學」自居。然而,隨著史學理論不斷的發展,「新史學」不斷地出現,又不斷地被後來的「新史學」所推翻或修正,史學理論愈發展愈發現史學理論的矛盾與困境,乃至上世紀後期「後現代主義史學」(postmodernism history)的各種理論出現,史學界眼見史學發展如此,進而宣布「歷史之死」。現代學者黃進興在《後現代主義與史學研究》中說:

其實,已逝的過去(the past)何嘗有生死可言,這些後現代主義者主要意謂傳統意義下的史學業已不存;他們堅稱逝者如斯,歷史的符碼無復負載真實的過去,史學道破了只是擬像(simulacra)或語言遊戲罷了。遵此,史家所使用的語言取代了歷史的事實,驟成史學首要考察的課題。若此「語言的轉向(the linguistic turn),不禁令人掛心作為學術訓練的實證史學是否氣數已盡?

從梁啟超開始的「新史學」,直到最近後現代主義史學,本文將之全部概稱為「新史學」,因為這些史學家都同樣以「新史學」的論述者自居。「新史學」中最大的爭議在於,傳統意義下的實證史學或者歷史主義史學認為,文獻以及各種實物都是足以信賴的歷史證據,史學家根據往事所留下的歷史證據,以移情(empathy)、想像(imagination)的方法記述歷史,就是可靠的歷史事實。後現代主義史學家則認為,傳統史學憑藉極為有限的歷史證據,而且可能是彼此矛盾、偽造的證據,而述說史學家自己無限想像的演變過程,如此以語言文字取代歷史事實的歷史,根本只是史學家自己的擬像與語言遊戲,而不是可靠的歷史。由於後現代主義史學家的指證歷歷,並且以嶄新的理論著作史著而形成潮流,使得傳統史學家有「歷史之死」的無奈、擔憂與恐懼,卻無力抗辯。

本文對於新史學間的紛爭無意著墨,因為如果一門學科對於學科本質的定義與定位錯誤時,必然產生無窮的爭論而無力解決,那麼「歷史之死」也就成為必然的結果。如果能夠對「什麼是歷史」進行正確的定義與定位,那麼「新史學」的紛爭自然能夠解決,並且發揮歷史應有的功能,對人類的發展可以作出有利的貢獻。因此,本文嘗試對以下的議題進行探討:

  1. 歷史的定義與性質為何?
  2. 歷史主體的範疇為何?
  3. 歷史的功能與目的為何?

對於上述三個議題,我們簡單地回顧一下新史學對這些議題的提出與討論。第一個議題「歷史的定義」,史學史上有極多的著作加以探討,而且數量之多,稱得上汗牛充棟。但是意見紛歧,莫衷一是,乃至已經到了厭煩的地步了。現代學者杜維運在《史學方法論》中說:

什麼是歷史?不是一個容易答覆的問題。近代西方史學家,曾不斷寫專文或專書來討論這個問題,結果是意見紛紜,莫衷一是。不少西方人士對於討論這個問題,業已有厭煩的感覺。

即使史學家對於「什麼是歷史」的基本問題,因為不能獲得妥適定義而厭煩不想探討,或轉而討論其他的議題,但是問題並不因此而消失,反而會擴及到其他的議題。後現代主義史學與實證史學爭論的本質,在於二者對法界—宇宙與生命—的事實真相無法了知,不能正確的觀察事實,所以對於「歷史」無法正確定義,於是產生爭論。例如,杜維運對於「歷史」作以下的定義與說明:

一般來講,所謂歷史,不外是以往實際發生的事件(簡言之為往事),或者是以往實際發生的事件的記錄(往事的記錄)。就前者而言,如西元前五世紀波斯的入侵希臘。就後者而言,如西方歷史之父希羅多德(Herodotus, c.484-c.425 B.C.)所寫的《波斯戰史》(History of The Persian Wars)。前者實際上已經過去了,以往實際發生的事件,早已消逝於天地之間,誰能讓波斯戰爭再重演一次呢?所以以往實際發生的事件,不就是歷史。歷史與往事之間,有很大的距離。後者大體上講是正確的,古今中外的史學家,誰也無法完全否認歷史是往事的記錄

杜維運雖然認為「往事」與「往事的記錄」都可以是歷史的範疇,但是最後仍然採取傳統史學的立場,將歷史範圍局限於「往事的記錄」,於是後現代主義的抨擊於焉產生。杜維運認為以往實際發生的事件,早已消逝於天地之間,不能再重演一次,但是戰爭事件中彼此殺害的因果關係,難道同樣地消逝於天地之間,彼此不能重新聚合報償因果嗎?「新史學」通常認為這是神學的問題而不願探討這個問題,但是對於歷史的定義而言,卻又是無法迴避的關鍵問題。

歷史的定義產生爭議的第二個重要關鍵是,歷史主體範圍是否正確而完整的確立。歷史主體若是不能正確而完整的確立,則必然產生史學邏輯體系的漏洞與錯誤。現代學者莊國雄在《歷史哲學》中說:

歷史主體是歷史過程的能動性根源,是任何歷史哲學思想體系的基礎和靈魂。在各派歷史哲學思想體系的爭議中,歷史主體之爭往往通過表現為邏輯起點之爭。任何思想體系都必須要有一個嚴密的邏輯起點,起點不同,終點也就不同,它是任何思想體系得以建立和展開的前提和根據。因而任何思想大師都非常重視自己思想體系的邏輯起點。

歷史主體是創造歷史、推動歷史演變的主角,如果不能確立正確而完整的主體,便無法瞭解正確的歷史體系及其運作。歷史作為一門現代學科,必然要符合邏輯與理性,因此邏輯的起點與終點便扮演著關鍵的角色。另一個重要的關鍵在於,任何的邏輯起點與終點,必須是基於可以觀察到的事實,而非憑空想像的幻想與猜測。……(待續)

歷史的範圍不能以史學家是否能夠記述而作定義,而應該以「歷史的本質實際應該為何」來思考歷史、定義歷史。本文認為:歷史是以所有存在的事實為範疇。一般史學家所說,以有形的方式記述歷史而成為文獻者,則稱為歷史書、史籍或文本,可以是延續及眾多歷史中的一環,但不是歷史的本身,更不可能函蓋全部歷史。因此,史籍只是部分歷史的記述而已,史籍相對於歷史而言,極為渺少。研究歷史的價值與意義的學問,稱為歷史學或史學。史學家在所有真實存在的事實中,挑選部分事實加以記述的權利,稱之為史權。凡有權利必有義務,相對於史權,史家必須記述真實,並負起令史學良善的責任,以及承擔著作史籍的因果關係者,稱之為史責或史德。此是就專業史學家的史權與史責所作的定義,至於史權與史責的廣泛討論,則留作後續的研究。

史學家普遍認為「歷史是往事」或者「歷史是往事的記錄」,故歷史必然是以「往事」為範圍,只具有過去性。史學家認為歷史具有現在性者,雖有而不多,皆視為異數。例如,黃進興在《後現代主義與史學研究》中舉例:

傅柯所謂的「當前的歷史」,於此必須稍加疏解,方能掌握其治史的緣起。……表面上,「當前的歷史」令人想起克羅齊(Benedetto Croce, 1866-1952)的名言「任何真正的歷史均是當代史」。但細究之,克羅齊的著眼點在認識論上,而傅柯則側重現時感。

本文不詳述傅柯(Michel Foucault,別譯為福柯,1926-1984)與克羅齊對歷史具現在性的內容。史學家普遍認為史籍除了必須依據已經發生的事實撰寫,而且是具有知識性的事實。譬如,梁啟超批判以往史籍常常記載不具知識性的事實—類似「鄰貓生子」之事—的不當。然而,梁啟超所批判的是史學家選擇事實的不當,並不否認「鄰貓生子」是事實。既是事實,即是歷史的範疇;「鄰貓生子」對人,或許沒有意義,可是對貓而言,就如同帝王將相生子一般,可能意義非凡,也是人間歷史的一部分;乃至也有可能因為鄰貓所生之子的事故,產生了人類之間的諍論乃至戰爭。史學家可能依於現況,追尋過去的事實,重新賦予現代的意義。由過去的事實可以來到現在,則可知事實必然具有過去性、現在性與未來性,亦使得歷史亦具有此三種性質。

所以當過去的事實現在被發現,或者當時被記錄流傳到現代,而確認成為知識時,歷史事實具有現在性;歷史事實可以作為讀者未來的參考,所以歷史也具有未來性。既然歷史具有知識性,又可以作為未來的參考(姑不論該件歷史知識的正確性),則歷史也同時具有現在性及未來性。例如,每一個人的生日,是一項以往實際發生的事實(姑不論其正確性),是往事,故為歷史具過去性;當前以此歷史事實,所以我們可以計算目前年齡的事實而具現在性,也可以正確推估未來某一年年齡的事實,故具未來性。

又如,佛陀說:「夫生有死,自世之常。」過去「夫生有死」是事實,是歷史具過去性;現在檢驗「夫生有死」是事實,即成歷史具現在性;未來「夫生有死」必是事實,必成歷史具未來性。此語由佛陀宣演是事實,是歷史具過去性;現在知是佛說,亦即歷史具現在性;未來亦知佛說,必成歷史具未來性。因此,就事實本身具有知識性,則歷史以所有存在的事實為範疇,必具有過去性、現在性與未來性。 然而,即使不具知識性的事實,也是歷史,同時具有過去性、現在性與未來性。例如,黃梨洲說:「大奸大惡將何所懲創乎?曰:苟其人之行事,載之於史,傳之於後,使千載而下,人人欲加刃其頸,賤之為禽獸,是亦足矣。」此說並不正確,因為如果「懲創大奸惡人,只要載於史籍傳後,亦足夠」,那麼黃梨洲應該主張廢除死刑、監獄,凡有奸惡一律載於史籍作為懲創,不必再身繫牢獄或處死刑。可是,歷史上並沒有以載於史籍取代司法懲創的案例,而且黃梨洲也不曾有行動落實此項主張,預計未來人類也不會有此作法的案例。……(待續)

史權、史責與史家
Historical Right, Historical Responsibility and Historians

摘要

史家的範圍是史學中極少人探討的議題,雖然此議題是極為重要的議題。本文以史權作為史家的特徵,以界定史家的範圍。史權的內容眾說紛紜,本文認為從種種事實中選擇與詮釋部分事實,以顯示其知識與價值的權力,即稱之為史家之史權。

史權的發生,係因為史家所接觸的事實過於龐大,無法一一記述,必須於無量的事實中擇要而記述。本文對於「史,掌官書以贊治」提出不同的看法,認為史權是與史官參與統治權截然不同的,而且對於史權的施行有所妨礙,以清楚界定史權的內涵,並且澄清史家的真正特徵。

史責則與史權是彼此相對應而存在,既有史權則史家必然有史責須要負擔。史責並不是由任何人對於史家課以責任,而是由於有儒家所信受「大一統」的因果法則,不斷地運作於法界之中,所產生的必然現象。史家施行史權,其實就是以其身口意行書寫其心中的法則,即是史家書法之史權。

大一統的史責有其一定的階位,概略可分為三個階層:第一階位是小緣威儀戒行;第二階位是唯一且大一統的因果法則;最高階位是因果法則的終極根源──第八識如來藏心。此三階位是史家施行史權時,不應該或沒有能力牴觸的史責。

依據史權的特徵,本文發現新聞工作者、媒體工作者,皆是符合史權特徵的史家,乃至可以擴充到人人皆是史家,十法界有情皆是史家。因為十法界有情都是歷史主體,所以都有史權以身口意行書寫法則,而不得不負起應負的史責,故形成十法界。十法界中,四聖法道的賢聖是真史家,其餘六凡業道眾生皆是假史家,是史家範圍的收縮。

一、緒論

歷史是以所有存在的事實為範疇。然而,史學家閱讀消化龐大史料,蒐集鉅細靡遺之史料,建構及解釋歷史之演變;如此龐大繁雜之史學研究,似乎隨著時間的累積而需要愈來愈多的史家投入,但是似乎也隨著時間的飄逝而永無窮盡。近代史學家梁啟超在《中國歷史研究法》中說:

我國二千年來史學,視他國為獨昌,雖然,彼其體例,多屬千餘年前學者之所創。彼時所需要之史,與今不同。彼時學問未分科,凡百智識皆恃史以為之記載。故史之範圍,廣漠無垠,積年愈多,為書愈多,馴至為一人畢生精力所不能殫讀。吾儕居今日而讀舊史,正所謂「披沙揀金往往見寶。」離沙無金,固也!然數斗之沙,得金一顆,為事既已甚勞;況揀金之術,非盡人而能。苟誤其塗,則取沙棄金,在所不免。不幸而中國現在歷史的教育,乃正類是。

梁啟超認為「凡百智識皆恃史以為之記載」,顯見在廣漠無垠的史料中,由於史籍篇幅有限,所記載的內容應該是有益於後人之知識,而非雜亂無用的資料。梁啟超又說「然數斗之沙,得金一顆,為事既已甚勞;況揀金之術,非盡人而能」,顯見史家所記載之內容,並非皆為有用之世間智慧或知識。若如梁啟超所說「數斗之沙,得金一顆,為事既已甚勞」,則史家所記者其實沙多金少,有用之智慧與知識甚渺。而且若要識得有用之智、識,還需要讀者有揀金之術;若無揀金之術,亦不得有用之智、識。最糟糕的情況是:史家「取沙棄金,在所不免」,史家棄金取沙,終是以沙傳沙遺禍後人。

杜維運在《史學方法論》中闡述史家所說者,有時不但是無用的沙,乃至是邪惡的,是災難的肇端:

人類的仇恨,國家民族的戰爭,往往肇端於歷史。當歷史為野心家所利用,而變成宣傳性的武器時,則大災難將由之以起。一八七○年的戰爭,大半由於狄亞爾(L.A.Thiers,1797-1877)的歷史作品,二十世紀以來世界更大的禍變,應歸因於崔次克(Heinrich von Treitschke,1834-1896)的史學「」作。史學家沈淫於盲目的愛國主義(blind patriotism)以錯誤的歷史觀念,引導全國完成歷史使命(historic mission),其不為現實政治中的野心家所利用者幾希,其不導致血流成渠、尸骨遍野的慘劇者幾希;史學家衹知為政治服務,衹知一個馬克斯的歷史理論,以生產條件、階級?爭解釋所有的歷史,其不引起人間仇恨者幾希,其不導致人類完全喪失人性而趨於毀滅者幾希。……「讀項羽之破王離,則鬚眉皆奮而殺機動;覽田延年之責霍光,則膽魄皆張而戾氣生」,《史記》、《漢書》的過分其詞,其所產生的後果,實非原作者所能想像。荷馬(Homer)的史詩《伊立亞德》(Iliad)所創的典型英雄人物亞奇里斯(Achilles)及亞加門諾(Agamemnon),也為世界帶來無窮困擾,以後所有劣史學家,從荷馬所學者,為渲染此類英雄人物的事蹟,而促成戰爭的不斷發生。所以人類所珍貴的史書及其他典籍,毀於戰爭,自極不幸,更不幸者,為此類典籍,為戰爭所引出,尤不幸者,為此類典籍,為戰爭作了前驅!歷史!歷史!斯世以有你而絢麗,斯世亦因你而黯澹!

杜維運例舉西方近代史家狄亞爾、崔次克、馬克斯等人,以錯誤的歷史觀念引發戰爭;再舉東方古代史家司馬遷、班固所撰的《史記》、《漢書》過分其詞,煽動讀者情緒;又舉西方古代史家荷馬渲染亞奇里斯、亞加門諾等的事蹟作為英雄人物,而促成戰爭的不斷發生。杜維運慨嘆史家「為戰爭作了前驅」!

既然古代、近代史家有這麼多弊病,現代史家發現後,應該可以改正而免除弊病吧?事實卻不然。現代歷史學者杜正勝在《新史學之路》中說:

歷史家」是一種職業分類,或是一種專業知識的分類,「職責」則屬於倫理學的課題。凡人必有應該履行或遵守的職責,歷史家也是人,然而我們不討論「人的職責」而討論「歷史家的職責」,顯然和「歷史」這種專業知識或「歷史家」這種職業或身分有關係。……由於現代歷史家長期專業化、學院化的結果,大家比較不關心作為歷史家的職責這個問題。

杜正勝認為史家是一種職業分類,或是一種專業知識的分類;可是現代歷史家長期專業化、學院化的結果,大家比較不關心作為歷史家的職責這個問題。顯示現代史學訓練專業化、學院化的內容是值得商榷的,因為專業化、學院化,竟然令史家不關心作為歷史家的職責這個問題,則史家豈不皆成一群不關心自身職責的人?一群不關心自身職責之人,如何可能是良好的史家?……(待續)

古代政權賦予史官獨享著史的權利,但是史權本屬於史家,並不是掌有政權的君王所能永遠侵奪禁止。中國最早、最有名的私撰史籍施行史權,應屬孔子,因為孔子並非史官,卻主動撰寫《春秋》抒發政見。梁啟超雖然承認《春秋》是史籍的模樣,卻認為《春秋》是經而非史,孔子並非史家,因為《春秋》所記載的內容,違反史籍求真、求實的最基本原則。

梁啟超認為《春秋》是經非史,是指孔子作《春秋》係表達其「為親賢諱」的價值觀,所以《春秋》是經而不是史。然而章學誠主張「六經皆史」,則指六經係「經世致用」典章的實跡,也是史料。因此,不論從孔子想要傳達「為親賢諱」的價值觀而言,或者從六經皆治世之實跡而言,其實都可以歸為史學研究的史料。孔子私撰《春秋》,正足以說明史權是史家記述事實的權力,而不是參贊統治的權力。

梁啟超所舉許多非史官而撰史的歷史事實,證明撰史的權力不是統治政權之所能限制,而是史家的權力特徵,正足以作為辨識史家的標準。因此,從種種事實中選擇部分事實加以記述,以顯示其知識與價值者,才是真正的史權;而史權之施行,才是史家最重要的特徵。至於史家是否為一種職業,或者參與統治權,都不是史家的特徵。

又有學者認為「史權」是史家掌管機構收集中央政府各種史料的權力。例如,王汎森說:

談「史權」則理想上應該讓史家掌管一個機構,收集中央政府的各種史料,而且要在各直省府州廳遍設史館,收集各地人民之史料,且由史家發揮獨立的精神,撰寫充分關照人民歷史的史書。

透過政府機構直接蒐集文件史料固然是史學上的「理想」,但是這樣的「理想」並不是史家必然可得的「權利」,也不是史家的特徵,更不是史家所能為力的。……(待續)

佛學研究與歷史想像──以阿含部經典略評呂凱文〈從兩類《央掘魔羅經》探討聲聞經大乘化的詮釋學策略〉
Buddhist Research versus Historical Imagination --A Brief Comment, based on The Agama Sutras, on Lu Kaiwen's "How Did Mahayana Buddhism Reform Savaka Sutta?: On Mahayana's Hermeneutical Strategies by Two Kinds of Buddhist Paradigms of Aṅgulimāla Sutta"

摘要

釋迦牟尼佛出現在歷史上而創建佛教,是一項歷史事實。然而,這樣的歷史事實具有什麼樣的歷史意義,則是少有人知,乃至學術界的佛學研究者亦不能知。佛學研究者從歷史、文學、藝術等等不同的角度論述佛教。然而,對於佛教的認識,若是不能以實證的方法,從佛教的義理著手,則對於佛教歷史與文學的認識,必然不能產生穩固的見解。

本文以佛教的基本歷史事實,所賦予的歷史意義,對呂凱文之論文中有關佛教歷史與文學所提出種種錯誤的主張,進行評論。呂凱文主張釋迦牟尼佛首先宣說的聲聞法代表的「聲聞佛教」是「舊佛教」,而部派佛教之後的大乘是「大乘佛教」是「新佛教」。這項主張並不符合歷史事實,表示呂凱文對於釋迦牟尼佛成佛的歷史意義並不瞭解。釋迦牟尼佛成佛本身所代表的正是大乘佛教,釋迦牟尼佛是大乘佛教最主要而具體的代表;因此,釋迦牟尼佛成佛時,就已經成立大乘佛教。所以,佛教沒有新舊佛教之分,更不存在歷史想像的「聲聞佛教」、「舊佛教」、「新佛教」、「聲聞典範」與典範轉移。

呂凱文對於經典進行分類的標準,亦導因於錯誤的歷史想像,也使得其經典的分類充滿邏輯的不一致性而矛盾百出。本文在呂凱文的論文僅擇數項議題進行評論,以顯示真正的佛學研究,不應該陷入歷史的想像中:一、新舊佛教,二、共不共量性,三、分類定義,四、隱匿文獻證據,五、畏懼佛教義理,六、以基督教釋經學解構佛教,七、錯解格式塔圖,八、生物擬態。

呂凱文種種錯誤的主張,正是代表學術界的佛學研究,對於釋迦牟尼佛本身出現於歷史上所代表的歷史意義缺乏瞭解;往往忽視釋迦牟尼佛存在的歷史意義,而提出種種論述。因此,學術界的佛學研究者,若要能夠對佛教歷史與文學有正確的解讀,其最急需者則為對於釋迦牟尼佛的正確認識。本文即是以種種歷史事實,提出其歷史意義,以分辨真正的佛學研究與歷史想像的不同。

一、緒論

佛學研究是近代西方學術研究的新領域,其歷史不過一二百年,西方學術界直到十九世紀末才確定佛陀出現在歷史上是一項事實。亞洲採用西方學術研究方法與議題的佛學研究,則在日本明治維新之後才正式開始。對於近代亞洲的學術界而言,佛教是東方的重要文化內涵,可是研究方法與議題,卻必須追隨西方的研究腳步,實在是一項奇怪的歷史發展。

東方的亞洲對於佛教已經認識一千多年了,而西方不過才剛開始要認識佛教;那麼東方的亞洲應該以千年以上的佛教修證成果與學術基礎,運用西方的研究方法,將佛教介紹給西方學術界,以正確地認識佛教的本質。可是近代佛學研究的歷史發展卻是進行相反的歷程:對佛教有深刻認識與悠久歷史的中國佛學界,卻追隨曾經向中國取經的日本;而日本的研究方法與議題,又跟隨認識更不足而淺薄的西方佛學學術界。這種具有悠久歷史而熟稔佛教的國度,必須反向對佛教較不熟悉的國度取法,較不熟悉的國度卻又向更為陌生的西方世界取法。這是極盡嘲諷的歷史發展,也是因為近代歷史中,西方挾著研究物質文明實事求是的科學精神,令人錯以為西方對於心靈研究的文明,也同樣富有科學精神而超越東方。

如果西方對東方佛教學術研究的方法與議題正確,那麼就追求真理而言,東方的亞洲追隨西方又有何妨?中國地區的佛學研究追隨日本的佛學研究,又有何妨?但是,如果西方學術研究的方法與議題不正確,就追求真理而言,東方的亞洲放棄本有文化的成果與根基,追隨對佛教剛開始啟蒙的西方錯誤的腳步就顯得荒謬、可笑又可憐了;至於對佛教有最深刻的認識與最悠久的歷史的中國佛學界,卻要反過來追隨對佛教認識不足的日本與西方,那就令人覺得更荒謬、更可笑而又更可憐了。髻智比丘(Bhikkhu Ñ??amoli,原名Osbert Moore,1905-1960)在《親近釋迦牟尼佛》一書中,對西方佛學研究的描述,正好顯示西方對於佛教認識的不足與淺薄:

現在歐洲有關佛教史的文獻很豐富,佛教文學與教義的作品亦然。在佛教史學與佛教文學的領域裡,已有相當程度的共識,然而這樣的共識卻未顯現在教義的研究上。有許多各式的研究作出來,是為了要證明佛教教導「空無」或「恆有」;證明佛教是否定論者、實有論者、無神論者、有神論者或無一致性;佛教是改革的吠檀多學派(Ved?nta);是人性主義、悲觀主義、絕對主義、多元論、一元論;是哲學、宗教或道德體系等,幾乎是你要稱佛教是什麼,它便是什麼。

髻智比丘是出生於英格蘭的歐洲人,由於出家成為比丘,而能跳脫於西方基督文化的立場,一窺佛教深奧的教義。髻智比丘說,西方學術界對於佛教史學與佛教文學已有共識,而對於佛教教義的內容為何,並沒有獲得共識。但是,如果對於佛教教義不能正確的認識,卻說對於佛教史學與佛教文學能夠獲得共識,其實是不可能的。因為教義是根本,史學與文學是枝末;對於佛教所教導的,到底是「空無」或「恆有」都不能確定,如何能夠確認佛教史學的內容與目的呢?又如何能夠正確認識佛教文學所要傳達的意涵呢?如果對於佛教教義仍然處於「幾乎是你要稱佛教是什麼,它便是什麼」的階段,表示西方學術界對於佛教仍然是處於一無所知的狀態。那麼對於佛教史學的研究成果,極可能成為對於佛教歷史的想像,而不是佛教的真正歷史。那麼對於佛教文學的解讀與詮釋,也必然是想像中的意涵,而不是佛教真正所要表達的意涵。因此,髻智比丘對於西方學術研究的描述,正好顯示所有西方佛學學術研究仍然處於萌芽的階段,尚不能達到最終定論的階段。那麼現在所有仍然採取跟隨西方佛學研究腳步的日本與中國的佛學學術界,其佛學學術研究的成果,也必然仍處於尚不能達到最終結論的萌芽階段。

對於近一二百年慣於運用西方研究方法於佛學學術研究的反省與檢討,是個極少人從事研究的議題,但卻是範圍廣闊而且是極為重要的議題。因為這將涉及所有採用西方研究方法的佛學研究成果,其效度是否可靠的重大問題。本文所採用的研究策略,係以評論的方式,選取運用西方研究方法作為主要方法的學者進行評論,以限定研究的範圍與議題。

本文將對呂凱文所著〈從兩類《央掘魔羅經》探討聲聞經大乘化的詮釋學策略〉(以下略稱為「該文」)進行評論。該文發表於台灣大學文學院佛學研究中心,2006年7月出版的《佛學研究中心學報》第11期,頁31-83。呂凱文於該文中採用典型的西方佛學研究方法——文本對比的經文批判方法,進行《央掘魔羅經》的對比研究與詮釋學策略的研究。該項研究方法是佛教文學的研究方法,但同時也涉及對於佛教史學與佛教教義的判讀。筆者認為不論是佛教文學的研究方法,或是對於佛教史學的判讀,皆應該是基於佛教教義基本理論的理解。由於該文同時涉及佛教教義、佛教歷史與佛教文學等三個彼此影響的議題,正好適合本文進行佛學研究的評論,因此便選取該文作為評論的目標。……(待續)

從上述《阿含經》與《瑜伽師地論》的文獻證據舉示可知,呂凱文主張「《瑜伽師地論》亦未見到『小乘』一詞」,或者主張「從未見過初期佛教使用過『小乘』」詞彙」,都是不符合文獻證據的主張。從如此多處違反文獻證據的情形而論,呂凱文的主張顯然是違反事實的歷史想像,而不是具有學術性與知識性的佛學研究。

又,呂凱文主張:以成為人天師(即佛陀)自居的菩薩思想,與聲聞佛教相較是晚起的。這樣的主張同樣是違背歷史的事實。因為佛教歷史的共識皆是釋迦牟尼佛成佛之後,才宣說聲聞法而度五比丘。顯然釋迦牟尼佛必然是經過修行之後才成佛,那麼釋迦牟尼佛成佛之前是修學哪一乘呢?前舉《長阿含經》卷2:「佛為海船師,法橋渡河津;大乘道之輿,一切渡天人」,既然已經說明佛陀是教授大乘法道而渡一切天與人,則顯然釋迦牟尼佛本身就是大乘法道菩薩修行的代表。在《長阿含經》卷1也有同樣的文獻證據:

菩薩逆順觀十二因緣,如實知。如實見已,即於座上成阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。

根據上述記載,毘婆尸菩薩逆順觀因緣法,而且如實知十二因緣的根源所在,亦能如實知十二因緣可以從無始劫前存在,至今仍然存在的事實真相,而成就無上正等正覺,顯然即是表示諸佛都是修學菩薩法而成佛的;然而,小乘人逆順觀十二因緣時,現觀十二支因緣皆是無常、苦、空,皆虛妄而應滅盡無餘,故不能如實知十二因緣的根源,亦不能如實知生滅的十二因緣為何可以不斷存在至今的事實真相。由此可知,面對同樣的世間現象現觀十二因緣,而大小乘心智廣狹不同,故所證亦不同。所以,每一位佛陀成就佛道,正是代表著大乘菩薩所成就的極果。

因此,釋迦牟尼佛成佛而非單只成阿羅漢之後,才宣說聲聞法度五比丘;其所代表的歷史意義,就是大乘菩薩法道先於聲聞法道,是先有菩薩法道之後,才能夠有聲聞法道。除非呂凱文可以舉證最早實證聲聞極果的五比丘,是在釋迦牟尼佛成佛之前,就已經修學聲聞法而實證阿羅漢果;或者舉證釋迦佛是成為阿羅漢而尚未成佛,就度五比丘成為阿羅漢,才能主張大乘菩薩法道是晚起的;否則從釋迦牟尼佛成佛後,才宣說聲聞法的歷史事實,即足以證明大乘菩薩法道先於聲聞法。因此,成為人天師的大乘菩薩法道並不只是思想而已,而是由釋迦牟尼佛經由實踐而完成的歷史事實,是早於一切聲聞與緣覺,是佛陀成佛時便立即成立的法道。由此可知,呂凱文主張「菩薩思想是晚起的」是違背歷史事實的錯誤推論,也是完全不合邏輯推理的歷史想像,而不是符合歷史事實的佛學研究。

再者,呂凱文主張其所謂的「舊佛教」——即「聲聞佛教」,是佛弟子忠實於佛陀之教導;如此說法已經違背自己的主張,因為已經顯示是先有大乘的佛陀之後,才有聲聞佛教中的阿羅漢們;反過來也意味著其所謂「新佛教」—即「大乘佛教」—的菩薩行者,效法佛陀成為人天師,是不忠實於佛陀的教導。……(待續)

A Further Discussion on the Fourteen Questions of Identification in The Agama Sutras──Also on the Principle of Equal Effectiveness for Documental Evidence

Abstract

This article discusses the meaning of identification, the categories of identification, the reason why the Buddha had the capability of various identifications, and the reason why other religions have no capability of identification. Based on these discussions, this article further investigates the fourteen questions of identification. It is found that the reason why the Buddha had the capability of identification is that the Buddha personally realized the permanent existing Tathagatagarbha. Due to the fact of the real existence of Tathagatagarbha, the Buddha had the capability of identification, the liberation of Hinayana does not fall into nihilism, and the cycling of births and deaths of sentient beings can thus be in effect and conforms to the retribution of cause-and-effect.

The conditioned dharma is the fundamental Buddhist doctrine. The Chung-Hwa Institute of Buddhist Studies claims that “the nature of dependent-arising (idappaccayata)”is the truth and exists permanently, is the power for the conditioned dharma to work, pertains to the conditioned dharma, and does not need the existence of another neither-arising-nor-ceasing dharma. But this article finds out from the Buddhist sutras that even though “the nature of dependent-arising” and “the nature of return-to- extinction” exist permanently, they must depend on the aggregates, fields, and divisions, which have the nature of arising-and-ceasing, to exist and manifest themselves. Without the dharmas of arising-and-ceasing aggregates, fields, and divisions, both “the nature of dependent-arising” and “the nature of return-to-extinction” will not be able to exist or be realized. The aggregates, fields, and divisions, with the natures of dependent-arising and return-to-extinction, are only some of the intrinsic-natures of Tathagatagarbha, and do not belong to the conditioned dharma itself. Therefore, the real existence of neither-arising-nor-ceasing Tathagatagarbha is indeed the foundation for the conditioned dharma to exist and also the root of the theory of “the empty nature of dependent- arising.”

The fourteen questions are tough to solve and had been in existence before the Buddhism was founded. Is it unidentifiable because the Buddha could not answer the question about “the real existence of Tathagatagarbha” that the fourteen questions point to? Or is it identifiable because the Buddha could answer it? Besides, it is concluded in this article that the sixty-two non-Buddhist views include all non-Buddhist views and that the fourteen questions are the outline of the sixty-two views. The key point of whether the fourteen questions are identifiable or unidentifiable depends on if the questioner has the scientific spirit of positivism and the correct understanding of the “real existence of Tathagatagarbha.”

It is also found that, in the Buddhist research academia, the prerequisite for precisely understanding Buddhist sutras and obtaining correct results is to comply with the principle of equal effectiveness for documental evidence when citing references. Without following this principle, most of the research results may not be valid.

Preface

The purpose of academic research is to find the truth of facts. In order to investigate the truth of facts, scholars should follow the basic principle of research methodology while doing academic research with different study methods. In Buddhist academic research, the following point is worth discussion: while applying the method of philology, one should follow the principle of equal effectiveness for documental evidence and recognize that the method of comparative reading in philology is neither superior to other research methods nor the only research method for investigating facts. If one misunderstands the true meaning of reference documents while doing comparative reading in philology, the conclusions will be wrong and worthless, and therefore, this kind of method is not good enough to be listed in research methodology. This point came from the reply of Chung-Hwa Institute of Buddhist Studies(abbreviated to Chung-Hwa Buddhist Studies below) to the author of “The Definition of Being in The Agama Sutras,” a paper in the first issue of Journal of True Enlightenment. In the reply letter, the editors of Chung-Hwa Buddhist Studiesthink:

If the keywords of thesis in your paper appear in more than two documents, the author has an obligation to do comparative reading, no matter the documents are of the same or different systems. Theravada or Northern Buddhist sutras are transmitted with many languages and from various sects, or translated in many different languages successively; it causes considerable difficulties or obstacles for the academic circle while reading the present documents. Simply concerning the Pali Samyutta-Nikaya of Theravada tradition and the Chinese Samyukta-Agama of Northern tradition, they are considered to be the first-hand documents of early Buddhism by researchers. After more than fifty years of research, the academia has achieved a general consensus that both have many the same, equal or similar sutras, wording, and contents; there is also much different wording. However, it can be conjectured that both had a common mother original form during the First Buddhist Council. As time and place changed, those Buddhist sutras nowadays have become Samyutta-Nikaya and Samyukta-Agama, etc. The editors suggest that you should do the comparative reading between “Samyukta-Agama, Sutras 37 and 296” and “Samyutta-Nikaya, S.22:94 and S.12:20.” Besides, in the correction column of Taisho Tripitaka, note 10 on the page 8 and note 8 on the page 84 already remind the readers that there are relevant documents; the sutra texts are not too much and disorderly. Comparative reading between the sutras of Theravada and Northern traditions can provide mutual inspiration, interpretation, and verification; they can have conversations with each other. It is a delight to seek sameness while keeping difference.

Chung-Hwa Buddhist Studies claims that “If the keywords of thesis appear in more than two documents, the author has an obligation to do comparative reading,” and if this rule applies to all papers, it would mean that the method of comparative reading in philology is superior to that of hermeneutics. However, we have examined many published papers and do not find that this rule is mandatory to support their view, including those papers reviewed and published by Chung-Hwa Buddhist Studies. “The obligation of comparative reading” does not refer to having two documents or being keywords but refers to the following condition: if there is difference between documents and this difference should be taken as the subject of investigation, it is necessary to do comparative reading. Therefore, the freedom to choose the subject and method of study is a natural right of the academic world. “The obligation of comparative reading” is not mandatory. Especially, if the academia generally recognizes that the relevant documents are consistent, it is totally unnecessary to do comparative reading between different versions. The request by Chung-Hwa Buddhist Studies for “the obligation of comparative reading” is precisely to claim that there is definitely a great difference between Theravada Nikaya and the Northern Agama Sutras, and the author should take this difference as the subject of study. Nevertheless, if the difference were really huge, how could it be established that “however, it can be conjectured that both had a common mother original form during the First Buddhist Council”? Therefore, if Chung-Hwa Buddhist Studiesholds that there is “much difference” between those two, they should claim that those two ought to have different m?tik? (female parent). However, such a claim does not conform to the true facts and the recognition by the academia, so Chung-Hwa Buddhist Studies is forced to correct the effect of “much difference” and directly point out the real consensus of the academia lest they might come to the conclusion that there are “different m?tik?.” Hence, the term “much difference” is not a quantitative or qualitative description; it cannot be used as an excuse to request “the obligation of comparative reading,” nor as the criterion for paper review.……(continue)

The contents and categories of identification

Before the study into whether the fourteen questions are identifiable or unidentifiable, one should first understand the meaning of identification as well as its contents and categories. According to The Agama Sutras, the category of identification is an important teaching part of the Buddha’s preaching contents, no matter in the nine divisions or the twelve divisions of the sutras. Therefore, there is one category such as Prophecy Sutra considered as the important content of preaching Buddhism. The Dirgha-Agama, Vol.12 states:

Therefore, Bhiksu! One verifies by oneself the twelve divisions of the sutras and should spread them widely. The twelve divisions of sutras are as follows: 1. sūtra, 2. geya, 3. vyākaraṇa (Prophecy Sutra), 4. gāthā, 5. Dharmapada (udāna), 6. itivṛttaka, 7. jātaka, 8. nidāna, 9. vaipulya, 10. adbhuta-dharma, 11. avadāna, 12. upadeśa. They should be properly followed, correctly observed, widely expounded, and spread.

Why did the Buddha expound Prophecy Sutra and present various categories of identification? Is there any significance in preaching Buddhism? What are the contents identified by the Buddha? All of these are worth investigation. The Dirgha-Agama, Vol.12 (D. 29; in this paper, the number marked in the parentheses after the Northern Agama Sutra indicates the related Theravada sutra text, which are references for the readers to do comparative reading; below is the same as here.) states:

Perhaps, some non-Buddhist Brahmacarin might say: “The Buddhist sramana speaks of the non-dwelling dharma.” One should reply to his words: “Virtuous one! Do not say that ‘the Buddhist sramana speaks of the non-dwelling dharma.’ Why? The Buddhist sramana speaks of the dharma that permanently exists and cannot move or turn around. For example, the door sill always exists there and does not move. Similarly, the Buddhist sramana speaks of the dharma that permanently exists and is unmoving.” Perhaps, some non-Buddhist Brahmacarin might say: “Sramana Gautama knows all things of previous lives but not those of future lives.” Those bhiksus and non-Buddhist Brahmacarins have different wisdom. Their observation of wisdom is also different. What they say is erroneous. Tathagata sees and knows those things of the past as if they are in front of Tathagata‘s very eyes. For those things of the future, Tathagata’s knowledge comes from the wisdom of dharma-way. If those things of previous lives were illusory, unpleasant, and unbeneficial, the Buddha will not identify them. If those things of previous lives were real, but unpleasant and unbeneficial, the Buddha will not identify them either. If those things of previous lives were real, pleasant, but unbeneficial, the Buddha will not identify them either. If those things of previous lives were real, pleasant, and beneficial, the Buddha knows all of them and then identifies them. So does the Buddha for those things of the future and the present. In the past, future, and present, Tathagata speaks the timely words, the real words, the justicial words, the beneficial words, the dharma words, and the vinaya words, without falsehood. During the time between the first night the Buddha attained the ultimate true enlightenment and the last night before the Buddha’s death, what the Buddha says is all true as things really are, so the Buddha is called Tathagata. Furthermore, what Tathagata says is as true as the real thing is and the real thing is like what Tathagata says, so the Buddha is called Tathagata. In what meaning is it called equal and true enlightenment? The Buddha fully perceives what the Buddha sees, knows, extinguishes and senses, so it is said that the Buddha attains equal and true enlightenment.

According to the sutra, the Buddha did not agree with the non-Buddhist Brahmacarin’s statement that the Buddhist sramana only explained the non-dwelling impermanent dharma(the dharma of dependent-arising without self-nature, which comes only from conditions without any cause). Besides, the Buddha requested that his disciples should clearly express their opposition to such a statement. It is because that all the dharma spoken by the Buddhist sramana is the permanently existing and eternal dharma. For example, a door has the door sill (door frame) which always exists and never moves, serving as the limitation to the door movement. Except the moving door slab that frequently opens and closes, the composition and function of a whole complete door must have the door sill that is always there unmoved to serve as the last support. It is impossible that there exists the impermanent dharma like the opening and closing of the door slab without the support of everlasting unmoving door sill. This is the true aspect of a door. One cannot only see the door slab which continuously opens and closes while neglecting the existence of the door sill that is always there unmoved to act as the limit and support of opening and closing. The moving door slab representing the arising-and-ceasing conditioned dharma while the unmoving door sill representing the neither-arising-nor-ceasing everlasting dharma behind, such a metaphor is indeed very impressive.……(continue)